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University of Birmingham
How do states attempt to use their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states, and under what
conditions do they succeed? I argue that economically driven cross-border mobility generates reciprocal political economy ef-
fects on sending and host states. That is, it produces migration interdependence. Host states may leverage their position against a
sending state by either deploying strategies of restriction—curbing remittances, strengthening immigration controls, or both—
or displacement—forcefully expelling citizens of the sending state. These strategies’ success depends on whether the sending
state is vulnerable to the political economy costs incurred by host states’ strategy, namely if it is unable to absorb them do-
mestically and cannot procure the support of alternative host states. I also contend that displacement strategies involve higher
costs than restriction efforts and are therefore more likely to succeed. I demonstrate my claims through a least-likely, two-case
study design of Libyan and Jordanian coercive migration diplomacy against Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. I ex-
amine how two weaker Arab states leveraged their position against Egypt, a stronger state but one vulnerable to migration
interdependence, through the restriction and displacement of Egyptian migrants.
Introduction
“The number of people makes the wealth of states.”
Frederick the Great
“It’s an easy decision for Mexico,” wrote Donald Trump in
his March 2016 memo to the Washington Post. In it, Trump
detailed how he intended to force Mexico to finance a bor-
der wall between the United States and its southern neigh-
bor. He would threaten to cut off its migrants’ remittances.
“Make a one-time payment of $5–$10 billion to ensure that
$24 billion [in remittances] continues to flow into their
country year after year … we have all the leverage … Mexico
is totally dependent on the United States as a release valve
for its own poverty” (Washington Post 2016).
Cross-border population mobility often generates both
tensions and opportunities for leverage in global politics.
The European Union (EU)’s muddled response to migrant
and refugee flows across the Mediterranean Sea has pro-
foundly shaped politics in many of its member states. In June
2017, a number of Arab states heightened immigration con-
trols and engaged in collective deportations of Qatari citi-
zens in order to exert diplomatic pressure on the Gulf state.
Meanwhile, European citizens in Great Britain accuse the
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British government of using them as bargaining chips in the
ongoing negotiations with Brussels over “Brexit.”
This article aims to expand our understanding of the in-
terplay between migration and power politics by examining
how labor migration features in coercive interstate relations.
It addresses two main questions: How do states attempt to
leverage their position as destinations for labor migration to
influence sending states? Under which conditions do these
attempts succeed?
I introduce the term migration interdependence to describe
the reciprocal political economy effects produced by labor
migration between sending and host states. I argue that
there are two ways through which host states are able to
manipulate migration interdependence in order to coerce
a sending state into specific policy shifts. Firstly, a host state
may pursue a strategy of restriction by limiting the outflow of
migrant remittances into a sending state, adopting tighter
immigration controls for citizens of a sending state, or do-
ing both. Secondly, a host state may pursue a strategy of dis-
placement by forcibly expelling citizens of a sending state.
The effectiveness of restriction or displacement depends on
whether a sending state is vulnerable to migration interde-
pendence. Vulnerable sending states are more likely to com-
ply with host-state demands, particularly if a host state ex-
ercises a strategy of displacement rather than one of mere
restriction.
The article proceeds as follows: I review the rel-
evant literature and present my theoretical model. I
then introduce two least-likely cases, selected for theory-
testing purposes through covariation and within-case anal-
ysis. In the first case, Jordan sought to coerce the
Egyptian state into increasing the supply of natural gas
into the country in 2012. In the second case, Libya aimed,
in 2013, to coerce the Egyptian state into complying with
the extradition of ancien régime elites, who had relocated
their political and economic activities in Egypt. The two
host states attempted to leverage their positions against
the sending state through strategies of restriction and
displacement of their respective Egyptian migrant labor
communities.
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In neither case did restriction strategies produce the de-
sired policy shift. But displacement led Egypt to comply
with both Jordanian and Libyan demands. Egypt arguably
yielded to Jordanian and Libyan pressures because it was, at
the time, vulnerable to migration interdependence. I find
little support for alternative explanations, and I also apply
the study’s framework on two attempts at coercion via dis-
placement against Egypt by Libya and Iraq in the pre-2011
period. I demonstrate that, at the time, the two host states
failed to produce compliance because Egypt was not vulner-
able to migration interdependence. Finally, I briefly exam-
ine how my argument might shed light on other instances
where host states attempt to coerce sending states and dis-
cuss avenues for future research on the politics of migration
interdependence.
Investigating Labor Migration as Interstate Leverage
International-relations theorists have only recently treated
the effects of labor migration on global politics as a sep-
arate field of inquiry. The realist and neorealist tradition,
in particular, traditionally approached labor migration as
a “low” rather than a “high” politics issue (Hollifield and
Wong 2014, 228), save for a few notable exceptions of schol-
ars working primarily on immigration or security politics
(Zolberg 1989; Weiner and Russell 2001; see for comparison
Teitelbaum 2001). The international-relations scholarship
tends to also examine host states at the expense of sending
states—that is, “to focus on the consequences of immigra-
tion in wealthy, migrant-receiving societies, and to ignore
the causes and consequences of migration in origin coun-
tries” (Castles, De Haas, and Miller 2014, 26). This hinders
our ability to theorize the international politics of migration,
as it obscures the role of economically driven cross-border
population mobility in interstate relations.
A first line of work that ties migration to coercive inter-
state relations sees cross-border mobility in terms of existing
power imbalances between sending and host states. Early
scholars of dependency theory, as well as recent critics of
globalization, focus on migration’s contribution to the “de-
velopment of underdevelopment” (Frank 1966). Rooted in
Marxist political economy, such research examines migra-
tion flows as part of broader patterns of uneven trade be-
tween “developed (migration receiving) and less-developed
(migration sending) countries” (Hollifield 2012, 366; see
for comparison Sassen 1988). Wallerstein and other world-
systems theorists identify that labor migration sustains “rela-
tions of domination” between these two groups of nations,
confirming the expectations of mainstream international-
relations theory regarding stronger powers exerting pres-
sure on weaker ones (Castles et al. 2014, 33). For instance,
Mexican migration into the United States features as a main
dimension in the power imbalances between the two states
(FitzGerald 2009, 55, 167–69). The presence of 15–20 mil-
lion Bangladeshi immigrants across India is indicative of
the unequal distribution of economic power between the
two states (Sadiq 2008). Although such work affirms the
importance of labor migration in interstate relations, it ap-
proaches economically driven cross-border population mo-
bility not as an instrument of foreign policy or coercion, but
as part and parcel of global power imbalances. How might
a host state leverage its position against a sending state for
specific policy goals?
Working broadly within the field of global power poli-
tics (Berenskoetter 2007; Goddard and Nexon 2016), three
separate research agendas allow us to identify potential
leverage mechanisms; firstly, work on economic remittances
long established the importance of such capital inflows
for sending states (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; Escribà-
Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015; Mosley and Singer 2015,
293–97; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014, 7). Eco-
nomic remittances constitute a valuable source of foreign
exchange and produce multiplier effects on the aggre-
gate economy (Kapur 2010). They enhance access to pub-
lic services (Adida and Girod 2011) and decrease demand
for social spending (Doyle 2015). The importance of mi-
grant remittances is frequently identified in the extensive
literature on state-diaspora relations (Délano and Gamlen
2014; Adamson 2017; Koinova 2014; Koinova and Tsoura-
pas, forthcoming). An extensive political economy literature
also highlights how remittances may also constitute a form
of rent distribution, particularly in the Middle East, and sug-
gests that it may contribute to the stability of sending states’
political regimes (Korany 1986; Richter and Steiner 2008;
Soliman 2011). Warnings regarding the risks of overreliance
on remittances, of Dutch disease effects, or of associated in-
flationary risks notwithstanding (Chami, Barajas, Cosimano,
Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel 2008), sending states ha-
bitually place significant value upon the ability to attract eco-
nomic remittances (Castles et al. 2014, 75–83).
Consequently, host states attempting to exercise lever-
age against sending states may target the latter’s reliance
on remittances, mainly via disrupting migrants’ ability to
send earnings home. The rationale behind such a strat-
egy of restricting remittances is similar to states’ adoption
of negative economic sanctions (Lindsay 1986; Hufbauer,
Schott, and Elliott 1990), as both mechanisms aim to force
target states’ compliance on a range of issues via disrupt-
ing capital inflows. “Because economic sanctions can im-
pose costs … without carrying the degree of risk attached
to military actions,” Martin (1993, 3) argues, “governments
use them to signal resolve and exert pressure for policy
changes. In a similar fashion, a host state may curtail mi-
grants’ financial transfers as leverage. There is a wealth of
empirical examples of host states targeting the outflow of
economic remittances for political purposes. The United
States’ embargo against Cuba prohibited migrants from dis-
patching remittances, while Cubans had to use third coun-
tries to transfer funds back home (Vanderbush and Haney
2005). When Japanese-North Korean relations deteriorated
in March 1999 as Pyongyang prepared to test-fire a new long-
range ballistic missile, Japan threatened to ban all migrant
remittances to North Korea, estimated at $600 million to $1
billion per year (Miyashita 2003, 163).
Beyond migrant remittances, cross-border mobility serves
a second political economy purpose for sending states. Po-
litical scientists identify that economically driven migration
allows for an outflow of domestic labor, constituting what
Turner described as a “safety valve” (1920), or the reduction
of labor surpluses and the easing of accompanying sociopo-
litical and economic pressures. Drawing on Hirschman’s
thesis on “voice” versus “exit,” research demonstrates that
sending states find it preferable to encourage the “exit”
of disenfranchised social actors rather than allow them to
“voice” their grievances (Hirschman 1970, 15–43; for com-
parison Dowding, John, Mergoupis, and Vugt 2000, 478–80;
Burgess 2012). Sending states often attempt to curb over-
population or unemployment, in particular, by aiming to
“export” citizens abroad. Such policies are evident in India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, as well as poorer Middle
East states, which traditionally promote labor migration to
the oil-producing Arab states (Weiner 1985, 445). The 1942–
1964 Bracero program allowed for the outflow of Mexican
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the second half of the twentieth century, Tunisia and Mo-
rocco began fostering emigration to Europe for similar po-
litical economy reasons (Brand 2006, 17), while Western
European countries, notably Germany, engaged in recruit-
ment of labor from Turkey and other Mediterranean states
(Martin 1991).1
By extension, I expect host states aiming to leverage their
position against a sending state to also attempt to restrict
the outflow of its citizens abroad. An extensive literature
exists on various methods of immigration control; a host
state may decide to curb immigration flows from a specific
sending state through the tightening of border controls, an
increase in security and policing, the introduction of new
visa requirements or the strengthening of existing ones, the
criminalization of irregular migration, and so on (Andreas
and Snyder 2000). Following Turkey’s shooting down of a
Russian Su-24M military aircraft near the Turkish-Syrian bor-
der on November 24, 2015, for instance, President Putin re-
sponded by suspending visa-free travel for Turkish citizens
(Schenk 2016, 481–86). The strengthening of immigration
controls, when employed within a coercive intestate context,
is similar to a potential disruption of remittances outflows;
by restricting sending states’ access to its labor market, a host
state aims to elicit their compliance.
Finally, beyond a strategy of restriction—disrupting the
outflow of migrant remittances, strengthening immigration
controls, or both—a host state may adopt a second strat-
egy, namely the expulsion of a sending state’s migrant pop-
ulation, either in part or in its entirety. This occurs ei-
ther through the deportation of a sending state’s migrant
community or through the implementation of policies that
render a migrant group susceptible to deportation. Such
policies may involve novel provisions on required documen-
tation or on immigrants’ family history (on the politics of de-
portation, see Ellermann 2009; De Genova and Peutz 2010;
Oyen 2015, 99–127). Security studies scholars approach
such policies of “demographic engineering” as extreme
measures (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001, 55–56, 65–74), for
they are able to target both a state’s reliance on migrant
remittances and its ability to allow the outflow of domes-
tic labor at the same time, effectively “capacity-swamping” it
(Greenhill 2010, 39). Russia’s 2008 law On the Legal Status
of Foreign Citizens includes the option to declare certain
foreigners “undesirable” (nezhelatel’nyi). Only in 2015, it was
estimated that it deported 117,493 foreigners, particularly
citizens of Central Asian and Western states (MVD Rossii—
Grazhdanskoe Sodeistvie). Similarly, foreign policy analysts
highlight how Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other Arab states do
not hesitate to deport certain states’ migrants, when bilat-
eral relations deteriorate (Kapiszewski 2001; Thiollet 2011;
Tsourapas 2015a; 2016).2
Under what conditions would sending states comply with
host states’ demands? Two research agendas are relevant.
Firstly, work on linkage and leverage suggests that strong
states are particularly successful when exercising coercion
against weaker states. Levitsky and Way’s seminal analysis of
linkage and leverage mechanisms (albeit without examin-
1 Similar to research on the effects of economic remittances on sending states,
a debate continues on the benefits of such outward mobility, with a number of
scholars arguing that it constitutes a form of “brain drain” for sending states. The
article is merely interested in identifying the perceived importance of emigration
for sending states.
2 At the same time, labor migration within the Middle East also ar-
guably constitutes an element of cooperation—rather than coercion—between
resource-rich/labor-poor and resource-poor/labor-rich autocracies (for compari-
son, Erdmann, Bank, Hoffmann, and Richter 2013; von Soest 2015; Tansey 2016).
However, this is beyond the scope of the study’s research questions.
ing cross-border mobility) focuses on how the West, namely
the EU (Levitsky and Way 2011, 87–129) or the United
States (130–80), exercised pressure upon weaker post–Cold
War states. Some scholars examine “suasion” games that fo-
cus on the dilemmas facing a hegemonic power (indica-
tively, Martin 1992). When would weaker host states be able
to leverage their position against stronger sending states?
A small literature has theorized that weak states may co-
erce stronger states within conditions of military conflict
and counterinsurgency (Mack 1975; Arreguin-Toft 2005; for
comparison, Paul 1994), but issue-linkage in the field of
labor migration has been examined only with regard to
stronger states’ “migration diplomacy” strategies (Tsourapas
2017). Similarly, Greenhill (2002, 2010) does not incorpo-
rate weaker host states in her analysis and focuses primarily
on forced migration.
Secondly, work on economic coercion suggests that inter-
state economic linkages may produce political compliance,
but may also produce resistance or nationalism. Not unlike
the debated effectiveness of economic sanctions as a policy
of coercion, placing restrictions on migrant remittances or
strengthening immigration controls may have little effect on
sending states’ compliance, as the cases of Cuba or North
Korea demonstrate. As a result, relevant work, particularly
within security studies, is unclear in its conclusions. Brand,
for instance, mentions how “it may make sense to think of
… Jordanian expatriate labor in Kuwait” as a form of “eco-
nomic statecraft,” but she does not carry this argument any
further (Brand 2013, 148). Oyen (2015) examines the in-
teraction between US foreign policy and the deportation of
Chinese citizens during the Cold War, but does not specify
whether expulsion constitutes a host-state strategy or an out-
come. Greenhill establishes that deportation produces com-
pliance when employed by sending or transit states against
liberal democratic host states, but her findings on its ef-
fect against sending states are inconclusive (see coding in
2010, 310–11, 312–13, 321). The following section provides
a novel theoretical framework that explains the conditions
under which such strategies will likely succeed in producing
sending-state compliance.
Theorizing Migration Interdependence and Coercion:
Sending-State Vulnerability to Restriction and
Displacement Strategies
This section brings existing work on migration in conversa-
tion with the international-relations literature on economic
interdependence. It puts forth a novel approach to under-
standing host states’ use of coercion against sending states
and the conditions under which it is successful. I iden-
tify how economically driven cross-border mobility gener-
ates reciprocal political economy effects on sending and
host states, or migration interdependence. I argue that a
host state may leverage its position against the sending
state by either deploying strategies of restriction—curbing re-
mittances, strengthening immigration controls, or both—
or displacement—forcefully expelling citizens of the sending
state. The success of these strategies depends on whether
the sending state is vulnerable to the political economy cost
incurred by the host state’s strategy, namely if it is unable to
absorb the incurred cost domestically and cannot procure
the support of alternative host states. However, I contend
that displacement is more likely than restriction to change
the behavior of the sending state, because of the higher costs
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Table 1. Sending state compliance to host state coercive strategies
Sending state vulnerability interdependence
No Yes
Restriction Compliance unlikely Compliance somewhat likelyType of host state strategy Displacement Compliance unlikely Compliance very likely
The previous examination of cross-border mobility and
interstate relations points to the need to conceptualize la-
bor migration as form of trade between sovereign nations
that generates interdependence between sending and host
states (Hollifield 2012, 366; for a history of the concept,
see Cooper 1972; Baldwin 1980). Interdependence is ap-
proached here as “reciprocal effects among countries or
among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye
2012, 8). Similar to financial transactions or foreign trade,
I expect economically driven cross-border population mo-
bility to engender political economy effects among states,
or migration interdependence. Drawing on the literature
on states’ labor emigration and immigration policies, I de-
fine migration interdependence in a minimalist fashion, as
the reciprocal political economy effects arising from cross-
border flows of people between a sending and host state.3
According to Hirschman’s (1945, xvi) landmark study, the
international trade system is “vulnerable to the will of any
government so minded to use it in the pursuit of power.”
Rather than constitute a Millian force for international co-
operation, “commerce can become an alternative to war …
by providing a method of coercion of its own in the rela-
tions between sovereign nations” (14–15). Hirschman also
lays out the two mechanisms through which a state may em-
ploy trade as an instrument of power against a target state
in conditions of interdependence, consisting “mainly of the
threat of severance and ultimately of actual interruption of
external economic relations with that country” (16).
While Hirschman does not discuss cross-border popula-
tion mobility, I introduce his framework into migration in-
terdependence. Building on existing work outlined in the
previous section, I argue that a host state may leverage its
position for coercive purposes against a sending state in two
ways: either by reducing a sending state’s migration interde-
pendence through restriction, or by severing it completely
through displacement. Restriction refers to host-state poli-
cies of curbing migrant remittances, strengthening immi-
gration flows, or both. It corresponds to Hirschman’s “threat
of severance,” (16) given that migration interdependence is
not severed; even at cases of extreme restriction, as in the
case of the American embargo against Cuba, for instance,
Cuban citizens were able to remain in the United States and
had devised ways to send remittances home via third coun-
tries. Displacement refers to host-state strategies of deporta-
tion and corresponds to Hirschman’s expectation of “actual
interruption of external economic relations” with the send-
ing state (16).
When are these two mechanisms of coercive migration
diplomacy successful in producing sending-state compli-
ance? I introduce two key terms from the literature on in-
terdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. For Keohane and
Nye, sensitivity “involves degrees of responsiveness within a
policy framework”; as a result, “sensitivity interdependence
3 While the article does not argue that the impact of a complex phenomenon
such as migration is limited to political economy, its analysis focuses on effects
produced by labor migration as a form of interstate trade. Similarly, transit states
may also generate migration interdependence, but this is not analyzed here.
is created by interactions within a framework of policies”
(Keohane and Nye 2012, 12). The sensitivity of Western
states’ economies to increased oil prices in the 1970s was
“a function of the greater costs of foreign oil and the pro-
portion of petroleum they imported” (12). Similarly, in this
article’s framework, the existence of migration interdepen-
dence constitutes the threshold for establishing a sending
state’s sensitivity to migration interdependence. The sensi-
tivity of the Mexican state to Washington’s 1964 termination
of the Bracero Program was a function of the political econ-
omy costs incurred once the United States restricted further
immigration of Mexican contract laborers. Ghana’s sensitiv-
ity to Nigeria’s 1983 displacement of African labor immi-
grants was a function of the political economy costs incurred
once Nigeria displaced more than one million Ghanaian
citizens.
While sensitivity assumes that the policy framework re-
mains unchanged, “the vulnerability dimension of interde-
pendence rests on the relative availability and costliness of
the alternatives that various actors face,” and “can be mea-
sured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments
to a changed environment over a period of time” (13). “The
fact that the United States imports approximately 85 per-
cent of its bauxite supply does not indicate American vulner-
ability to actions by bauxite exporters,” Keohane and Nye
argue, “until we know what it would cost (in time as well
as money) to obtain substitutes” (13). In the context of mi-
gration interdependence, therefore, one would expect that
sending states’ vulnerability is established by their inability
to make effective adjustments with regard to the political
economy costs incurred by the change in the policy frame-
work through a host-state strategy of restriction or displace-
ment. In particular, two conditions must be satisfied in order
for a sending state to become vulnerable to a host-state strat-
egy: the sending state needs to be unable to both absorb the
incurred cost domestically and to procure the support of al-
ternative host states.4
Empirical evidence attests as to why the two conditions’
coexistence is necessary for establishing sending states’ vul-
nerability interdependence. A state may not be able to find
alternative states willing to bear the cost of a host-state strat-
egy of restriction or displacement, but that would not ren-
der it vulnerable if it is able to absorb the cost of such
a strategy domestically. For instance, European states’ in-
creasingly restrictive labor immigration policies in recent
decades reduced Turkish immigration, but did not neces-
sarily affect the vulnerability of the Turkish state; despite
being “the main source of non-EU migration in the EEC
between 1960 and 1990, Turkey has entered a migration
transition” (Castles et al. 2014, 179) recent research sug-
gests. “As a consequence of relatively high political stabil-
ity and rapid economic growth, Turkey has transformed
4 One could argue that a sending state’s ability to contain any political costs
incurred by a host-state strategy (strikes, sit-ins, deportees’ protests) is also impor-
tant. However, I view such costs as spillover effects from a sending state’s inability
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from a net emigration into a net immigration country”
(Castles et al. 2014, 179). The strength of the Turkish
economy suggests that it was able to bear the costs of
European states’ restrictive policies domestically. Similarly,
a state’s weak domestic economy would not matter if it is
able to find alternative host states willing to bear the cost of
restriction or displacement. President Trump’s intentions to
employ restriction and displacement of Mexican labor does
not necessarily mean that the Mexican state will be vulnera-
ble to such a strategy, even if it is unable to absorb the polit-
ical economy cost of such strategies domestically. Canada’s
2016 decision to lift visa requirements for Mexican citizens
entering the country is expected to allow for a “surge of
Mexican immigrants” unable to reach, or not allowed work
in, the United States (Guardian 2016). The existence of an
alternative host state suggests that Mexico will not necessar-
ily be vulnerable to potential American strategies of restric-
tion or displacement.
Most frequently, sending states’ responses to host-state
strategies involve both the identification of alternative host
states and attempts to absorb (part of) the cost domestically;
for instance, in 1985, Colonel Gaddafi expelled an estimated
twenty thousand Tunisian workers from Libya (Vandewalle
2012, 144). Tunisia immediately launched emergency job
programs for displaced migrants. Ismail Khelil, the coun-
try’s planning minister, asserted that “it will take time,
but we will integrate them into the economy” (quoted in
New York Times 1985). At the same time, Tunisia diversi-
fied its emigration policy and encouraged formerly expa-
triate Tunisians to seek employment in Italy, which did
not require a visa for entry at the time (Natter 2015, 7).
Tunisia was not vulnerable to Libya’s strategy of displace-
ment. Sending states become vulnerable only once both
conditions are met; when Yemen failed to denounce the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait at the United Nations Security
Council (where it served as a nonpermanent member) in
September 1990, Saudi Arabia expelled approximately eight
hundred thousand Yemenis over the following two months.
Yemen, diplomatically isolated and burdened with a strug-
gling economy, barely provided for these returnees, as au-
thorities sought the help of the Red Crescent Society and
set up camps to house them (Okruhlik and Conge 1997,
560; Al-Rasheed 2010, 146). It was unable to relocate de-
ported migrants elsewhere, as other Arab states followed
Saudi’s example and deported more Yemeni workers. Po-
litically, the “monstrous” domestic upheaval that ensued
has been identified as a major cause of the Yemeni Civil
War (Dresch 2000, 186). This is not surprising as, arguably,
Yemen was vulnerable to Saudi Arabia’s displacement
strategy.
As per Keohane and Nye, while sensitivity is not politically
unimportant, “vulnerability interdependence includes the
strategic dimension that sensitivity interdependence omits”
(16). For the purposes of this study, vulnerability interde-
pendence allows the theorization of the conditions under
which a sending state is likely to comply with host-state coer-
cion. When a nonvulnerable sending state is faced with host-
state coercion, via restriction and/or via displacement, its
compliance is unlikely, as it is able to compensate for related
political economy costs. When a vulnerable sending state is
faced with host-state coercion via restriction, its compliance
is only somewhat likely, as the strategy is merely a “threat”
to sever migration interdependence, to borrow Hirschman’s
term. When a vulnerable sending state is faced with host-
state coercion via displacement, or an actual “severance” of
interdependence, it is very likely to comply given the high
political economy costs.
Methodology and Case Selection
I employ case-study methodology for the purposes of theory-
testing through deduction, and I rely on covariation and
within-case analysis (Bennett and Checkel 2015). Egypt con-
stitutes the largest supplier of migrant labor in the Arab
world (Tsourapas 2015a; 2016). It is also one of the ma-
jor sending states worldwide; it ranks as the eighth largest
remittance-receiving state and received $18.32 billion in
2015 alone (International Monetary Fund 2016). Care has
been taken so as to select two host states with diverse char-
acteristics. Jordan is an established monarchy whose size is
only 89,342 km2 (or 0.7 percent of the total Arab world ter-
ritory). Jordan also does not share a physical border with
Egypt and is not an oil-exporting state. On the other hand,
Libya in 2013 had just emerged from the first phase of
a brutal civil war. It is one of the largest Arab states (at
1,759,540 km2, constituting 11.4 percent of the total Arab
world territory), and shares a porous, 1,115-km border with
Egypt. Since 1962, Libya is a member of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
The study focuses on Egyptian labor migration to Jordan
and Libya under Mohamed Morsi, who became President
in June 2012 under the Muslim Brotherhood–backed Free-
dom and Justice Party. In the first case, Jordan aimed to co-
erce the Egyptian state into increasing the supply of natural
gas into the country while, in the second case, Libya aimed
to coerce the Egyptian state into complying with the extra-
dition of ancien régime elites, who had relocated their politi-
cal and economic activities to Egypt. The two host states at-
tempted to leverage their positions against the sending state
through strategies of restriction and displacement of their
respective Egyptian migrant labor communities. While the
strategy of restriction did not produce a sending-state policy
shift in either case, the strategy of displacement led to Egyp-
tian compliance with both Jordanian and Libyan demands.
The study treats the two cases as least-likely ones, which
“can strengthen support for theories that fit even cases
where they should be weak” (George and Bennett 2005, 121;
for contrast Rohlfing 2012, 62; Eckstein 1975). According
to existing research, neither Jordan nor Libya should have
been successful in their attempts at coercion. For one, both
host states are considerably weaker than Egypt (Vandewalle
2012, 86; Brand 2013, 2, 5). Egyptian gross domestic product
(GDP) exceeded $286 billion in 2013; in contrast, Libyan
GDP amounted to $65.5 billion in the same year, a bit less
than twice the Jordanian GDP ($33.59 billion). There is also
no evidence that Egyptian compliance was forced through
the intervention of any stronger, third state (be it regional
or international). At the same time, in 2012, Jordan and
Libya were not major sources of economic remittances, nor
were they hosting a large number of Egyptians at the time
(see Figures 1 and 2 below; World Bank 2015a, 2015b).
One could argue that Egypt complied with Libyan demands
because of future oil rent rewards, but such an expecta-
tion would be years away, given the extent of the Libyan
state’s disintegration. At the same time, it would not explain
Egypt’s compliance with the demands of Jordan, which is
not an oil-exporting state. An argument that Egypt complied
with Jordanian demands because the issue of natural gas
provision was not crucial would also be inaccurate: Egypt was
plagued with energy problems and power outages through-
out Morsi’s rule. In May 2013, amid scattered protests and
social media calls to avoid paying energy bills, Morsi admit-
ted to the Associated Press that only 80 percent of Egypt’s elec-
tricity needs were being met, saying “we have a real energy
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Figure 1. Bilateral remittances received by Egypt, 2013, in US$ millions (World Bank, 2015a).
A long discussion exists on the potential pitfalls of the
case-study method (Geddes 1990; Collier and Mahoney
1996), particularly if cases are selected on the dependent
variable. Yet a significant body of political science work high-
lights how “in the early stages of a research program, se-
lection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic
purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and vari-
ables leading to the dependent variable of interest” (George
and Bennett 2005, 23). Interestingly, both cases exhibit in-
case variance (cf. Blatter and Blume 2008), demonstrating
noncompliance to restriction and compliance to displace-
ment. Covariation and within-case analysis are employed to
substantiate the study’s theoretical claims (Gerring 2016).
Within-case analysis is well-suited to the “systematic examina-
tion of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed” (Collier
2011, 823), particularly in enabling qualitative tools to assess
the causal claims and mechanisms outlined in the previous
section (for comparison, Beach and Pedersen 2013).
A final note on data collection: fieldwork in authori-
tarian contexts presents unique challenges (Kapiszewski,
MacLean, and Read 2015, 218), particularly in light of the
fact that regional migration is traditionally considered a
security issue for Arab elites (Kapiszewski 2001; Tsourapas
2014). At the same time, research is plagued by a lack of de-
tailed, publicly available statistical data on intra-Arab flows
(Fargues 2014), as well as by the fact that migration man-
agement is handled at the highest levels of the executive
(Feiler 2003). As Brand (2013, 8) wrote on seeking statis-
tical data on the Jordanian political economy, “one works
under the assumption that such documents will probably
never be released, or may never have existed in the first
place.” Key elites that would be able to substantiate the
study’s findings are either unlikely to share any information,
such as Jordan’s King Abdullah II, or unavailable, such as de-
posed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who is currently
facing a death sentence conviction. To overcome these is-
sues, I rely upon a meticulous collection of the coverage
of regional labor migration issues in the 2012–2013 pe-
riod across the three main Egyptian newspapers (al-Ahram,
al-Akhbar, al-Gomhuriya). In an attempt to fill in gaps and sub-
stantiate Egyptian reporting, I also draw on non-Egyptian
Arabic media sources, particularly Jordanian and Libyan
coverage of labor migration. Finally, for the purposes of tri-
angulation, I employ semistructured expert and elite inter-
views conducted in Cairo (n = 31) between July 2013 and
June 2014 (for comparison Tansey 2007). This includes for-
mer Prime Minister Abdel Aziz Hegazy, current and former
ministers, and high-ranking Egyptian government officials.
Host-State Coercion Via Restriction and Displacement
Jordanian-Egyptian Relations and the Provision of Natural Gas5
According to a 2004 agreement between Cairo and Am-
man, Egypt is contractually obliged to supply natural gas
to Jordan via the Arab Gas Pipeline to the amount of
240 million cubic feet of gas per day until 2019 (al-Ahram,
June 3, 2013). Egypt found it impossible to continue the
supply of natural gas at these levels in the aftermath of the
2011 Arab Spring due to domestic energy shortages and fre-
quent attacks against the pipeline itself, which is also sup-
plying gas to Israel at reduced prices. Once in power in
June 2012, Morsi unilaterally decided to curb the export
of natural gas to Jordan, which saw its reliance on Egyptian
natural gas fall from 89 percent in 2009 to 17 percent by the
end of 2012. “As a consequence, the state-owned electricity
company, the National Electric Power Company (NEPCO),
made huge losses, in 2011 amounting to 5 percent of gross
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Figure 2. Egyptian migrant stock, 2013 (World Bank, 2015b).
domestic product (GDP)” and was faced with a $3.5 billion
deficit (Henderson 2015, 3). It was estimated that “every
time the supply is halted as a result of the frequent inter-
ruptions caused by the bombing[s], it costs the Jordanian
treasury $1 million per day” (al-Monitor, April 2014). Indica-
tively, the supply of gas to Jordan was interrupted more than
fifteen times between February 2011 and November 2012
period alone (al-Ahram, November 21).
In the bilateral conflict over this issue, Jordan employed
its status as host state of Egyptian labor in its coercive migra-
tion diplomacy. Egyptian migrant labor in Jordan has a long
history spanning back decades, when thousands of Egyptian
workers travelled through Jordanian territory in order to
reach Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries in the
Gulf that had been recruiting Arab labor in the aftermath
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Amin and Awni 1986). Over
the past few decades, Jordan also became a host state for
unskilled Egyptian migrant labor. This has been due both
to its fairly developed economy as well as to its position;
many Egyptians that were either unable to enter the Gulf
states, or did not wish to return to Egypt when their employ-
ment there was terminated, chose to pursue employment
in Jordan. A key characteristic of these migrant laborers is
that thousands of them lack legal documentation to validate
their employment status in Jordan. In 2012, it was reported
that only 167,000 possessed a legal working permit (Egypt
Daily News, December 19).
Jordan employed a strategy of restriction and, follow-
ing Egyptian noncompliance, displacement in its efforts to
have Egypt shift its natural gas provisions back to the 2004
agreement’s stipulations. In early December, Jordanian me-
dia and government sources began hinting at the need to
restructure the domestic labor market. Jordanian Minister
of Labor Nidal Qatamin declared “the necessity of launch-
ing a campaign in Jordan to regulate the labor market,”
(al-Ahram, December 9). The announcement focused par-
ticularly on Egyptian workers that were employed in the
Kingdom without a permit. Did Jordan’s decision to regu-
late the domestic labor market by targeting illegal Egyptian
migrants constitute a strategy of coercion against Egypt? Or,
could it merely have been driven by other factors, such as
the deterioration of the post–Arab Spring Jordanian econ-
omy (for contrast Yom 2015)? Qatamin publicly stated that
the regulation campaign was driven by a “security,” not “po-
litical” rationale (Middle East News Agency, December 9). Yet,
two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that this was a clear
attempt at using migration as interstate coercion. First, tar-
geted Egyptians had been pursuing employment within Jor-
dan for years, if not decades, making the timing of Jordan’s
policy shift suspect. Second, numerous sources confirmed
that Jordan’s policy shift formed part of its broader strategy
on securing Egyptian natural gas. Al-Jazeera reported an early
December 2012 meeting that Abdullah held at the house of
former minister Rajaii al-Maashar. The piece, entitled “Jor-
dan Swaps Egyptian Labor for Gas,” states the following:
According to the sources that spoke to Al-Jazeera.net,
the king revealed that his country is in possession
of some cards that it is using to send messages to
Cairo. Such cards include the presence of … Egyptian
workers in Jordan and the fact that Jordan is the
only passageway for the exported Egyptian vegetables
towards Iraq … One of the meeting participants
quoted the king as saying that the weak flow of
the Egyptian gas and it being cut off Jordan “destroyed
the Jordanian economy.” He also indicated that the
rise in debts over the past two years was mainly due to
the losses incurred by the power plant that had to use
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Al-Quds al-Arabi confirmed the meeting, adding that Ab-
dullah mentioned how “tens of thousands of Egyptians
working in the Gulf states go through [Jordanian town]
Aqaba in their movements,” which the Kingdom could fur-
ther use this as a bargaining chip against Cairo (al-Quds
al-Arabi, December 12). Given Egyptian inaction, Jordan
adopted a strategy of displacement, as the government an-
nounced that any Egyptian workers found working illegally
within the Kingdom would be subject to deportation. At the
same time, the Ministry of Labor began targeting Egyptians
who possessed valid permits but had been working in profes-
sions not included in their permits (Middle East News Agency,
December 13). Al-Hayat quotes a number of sources that af-
firm how:
The officials in Amman are very upset with their coun-
terparts in Cairo, and this is why they have sent a signal
to the Egyptians in order to express the dissatisfaction
of the Jordanian leadership. Amman is upset about a
number of issues, one of which being the fact that the
gas pipeline from Egypt to Jordan is no longer func-
tioning normally. Other official sources told al-Hayat
that “thousands of Egyptian workers were arrested in
Jordan during the last two weeks due to irregularities
in their papers and sent back to their country.” (al-
Hayat, December 12)
Deportations of Egyptian workers formally started on
December 8, when approximately two hundred migrants
lacking necessary documentation were expelled (al-Ahram,
December 9 and 11). By December 14, it was revealed that
Jordan had arrested hundreds of Egyptian workers, who
were found in violation of their residency permits and were
facing deportation. Following Abdullah, other Jordanian in-
stitutions underlined how the potential expulsion of Egyp-
tian migrants was linked to Egypt’s policy on natural gas.
The Amman Center for Human Rights Studies (2012, 1) is-
sued a telling declaration: “sadly the recent procedures of
deporting Egyptian workers came as a result of poor politi-
cal relationship between the two countries. While we stress
the relationship with our neighbor Egypt,” the report con-
tinued, “it is unacceptable for the new Egyptian leadership
to stop the implementation of bilateral economic agree-
ments and sacrifice [a] profound relationship.” Elites also
confirmed this state strategy: “official authorities in Amman
were leaking information about the presence of [a number
of] Egyptians working in Jordan without a license and in an
illegal way,” al-Quds al-Arabi reported. “The collective depor-
tation of the latter would address a harsh message to the
Egyptian government, and the Jordanian government chose
the shorter path and arrested hundreds of Egyptian work-
ers who were in violation of their residency conditions and
indeed deported them.” The newspaper’s report concluded
with a message from an unnamed, “prominent” Jordanian
politician who wished to send a message to Cairo: “We beg
of you. Our situation cannot tolerate having you tamper with
the gas issue any further” (al-Quds al-Arabi, December 13).
As per the study’s third claim, when faced with Jordan’s
strategy of displacement, Egypt complied with the host-state
demands. Morsi called Abdullah from London, where he
was on an official visit on December 9. This was the first
time the two leaders engaged in conversation since Morsi’s
electoral victory. The Egyptian president reportedly guaran-
teed an increase in the supply of Jordan with Egyptian gas
and agreed to create a joint bilateral committee on the is-
sue, in order to appease Abdullah. Simultaneously, Morsi
also dispatched Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandeel
to Amman, in an effort to solve this “silent crisis” (al-Quds
al-Arabi, December 13). Jordanian Prime Minister Abdullah
al-Ensour later reported to the media that Qandeel had re-
iterated Morsi’s natural gas assurances to Abdullah and con-
firmed that “Egypt will always keep its pledges and has no
intention to renege on any agreements” (al-Gomhuriya, Jan-
uary 19, 2013). According to al-Hayat,
[t]he diplomatic contacts launched at the highest
level between Jordan and Egypt succeeded in con-
taining the crisis that had erupted between the two
sides. In this respect, Egypt pledged to continue sup-
plying Jordan with gas and Amman promised to stop
deporting the thousands of Egyptian workers present
in the kingdom … Cairo promised to keep supply-
ing Jordan with gas after the misunderstanding that
had erupted lately. The two states had signed agree-
ments in this regard and President Morsi pledged to
respect them. Jordan for its part said that it would no
longer expulse the Egyptian workers whose papers are
not in order. Following these contacts and the agree-
ment that was reached, thousands of Egyptian work-
ers were released, and [1,900] people were even al-
lowed to go back to Jordan after being deported to
Egypt. (al-Hayat, December 21)
The Jordanian Ministry of Labor announced the formal
halting of Egyptian workers’ deportation, and the Egyp-
tian Minister of Migration was dispatched to Jordan to
resolve Egyptian migrants’ remaining administrative prob-
lems. A few days later, Morsi publicly thanked Abdul-
lah for “his decision to stop these measures” (al-Ahram,
December 13). “Egypt and Jordan overcame a labor prob-
lem that could have strained bilateral relations,” the Middle
East News Agency wrote, “thanks to direct high-level contacts
that were crowned by a personal phone call Egyptian Presi-
dent Mohamed Morsy had with King Abdullah II on Monday
evening” (Middle East News Agency, December 13). A minor
glitch in negotiations appeared in late January 2013, when
Qandeel was visiting Jordan to sign a bilateral agreement
on the legalization of Egyptian migrant workers. As was re-
ported across Egyptian media, host-state elites identified “a
delay of pumping Egyptian natural gas to Jordan,” which
presented a “new obstacle” in any bilateral migration agree-
ment. Khaled Azhari, the Egyptian Minister of Manpower
and Immigration, went on record to state that his Ministry
will coordinate with the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum “to
remove any obstacles facing Egyptian laborers in Jordan”
(quoted in al-Ahram, January 29, 2013).
Libyan-Egyptian Relations and the Extradition of Gaddafi-Era Elites6
Early the following year, Libya also successfully employed re-
striction and displacement strategies in its coercive migra-
tion diplomacy against Egypt. The ousting of the Gaddafi
regime in 2011 had created tremendous political turmoil in
Libya. Once the first phase of the civil war ended, the Gen-
eral National Congress emerged as the country’s legislative
authority and attempted to consolidate the transitional pro-
cess in Libya. The Congress identified that, since 2011, a
number of ancien régime members of the Gaddafi years had
fled Libya seeking refuge in Egypt. Egypt in the immediate
outbreak of the Libyan civil war had become a safe haven
for elites affiliated with the Gaddafi regime, who contin-
ued their economic and political activities from Cairo. The
Congress believed that their extradition and trial in Libya
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was necessary for Libya’s post-Gaddafi political transition.
But Egyptian authorities resisted such extradition requests,
citing a number of legal obstacles. For instance, Egyptian
courts had forbidden the extradition of Gaddafi’s cousin,
Ahmed Qaddaf Alddam, because he claimed to have Egyp-
tian citizenship. Similarly, other Libyan elites had already
filed applications for Egyptian asylum, making a potential
extradition to Libya legally difficult (see details in Reuters,
April 16).
In contrast to Jordan, Libya had been a preferred desti-
nation for Egyptian workers seeking employment opportu-
nities abroad since the early 1970s (Tsourapas 2015b; Feiler
2003, 101). The proximity to Egypt, the porous border be-
tween the countries, and the ample wealth that flowed into
the resource-rich but labor-poor country, which contains the
largest oil reserves of any African state, allowed the country
to become a major destination of Egyptian migrant labor.
In the later years of Gaddafi’s rule, immigration controls
for Egyptians became particularly relaxed (Tsourapas 2017).
Yet, Libya in 2012 contained only a small fraction of its ear-
lier migrant labor force, mostly unskilled and low-skilled
workers; in the post-2011 era, most Egyptians fled due to
the brutal Libyan civil war that, coupled with the NATO-led
military intervention, had contributed to the collapse of the
oil industry.
In the second half of 2012, Libya let it be known pub-
licly that remaining Egyptian migrants would be employed
as a strategy against Egypt in case of noncompliance with the
extradition requests. “A high-level source in [Egypt’s] Min-
istry of Manpower and Migration has confirmed that Libya’s
threats to expel workers is not just a rumor,” reported the al-
Zaman daily in August 2012. “[The source] confirmed that
there has been deafening silence on the part of officials,
as concerns this issue and its being wrapped up with the
critical and private political matter about the handover of
senior members of the Gaddafi regime” (al-Zaman, August
28, 2012). Egypt downplayed the matter, while Farouk el
Dessouky, head of the Union of Egyptians Abroad, asserted
that “there is no abuse against Egyptians in Libya because of
the crisis on the remnants of the Gaddafi regime” (al-Watan,
October 19, 2012).
In early 2013, Libya engaged in a strategy of restriction
seeking to shift Egypt’s extradition policy. The General Na-
tional Congress initiated the implementation of tougher
measures against Egyptians working in the country and iden-
tified that many Egyptians lacked proper immigration or
health certificates, were holding expired residency permits,
or had gained entrance into Libya via fraudulent docu-
ments. At the same time, members of the Egyptian Chris-
tian Coptic community in Libya were harassed and arrested
on illegal emigration charges (Daily News Egypt, March 2).
In mid-March, an Egyptian Coptic Church in Benghazi was
set on fire for the second time in 2013, while 55 Egyptian
Copts were arrested on charges of proselytization and re-
portedly tortured. One of them, Ezzat Attallah, eventually
died while in custody in a Tripoli prison (see full cover-
age in Middle East News Agency, March 14). The Egyptian
government did not respond to the Libyan strategy of re-
striction, leading Libya to employ a strategy of displacement
from late February onward; Egyptians found without proper
documentation were declared subject to immediate depor-
tation, as the so-called bilateral “visa crisis” escalated (al-
Ahram, February 25). The assistant Egyptian foreign minis-
ter officially denied that Egyptians were facing any discrim-
ination, although news broke that more than one hundred
Egyptians had been deported on March 18, all of whom had
reportedly paid 3,000 LE each (or $338, a sizeable sum) to
purchase employment visas for Libya (al-Jumhuriya, March
18). Similar to the Jordanian case, Libya gradually intensi-
fied its displacement strategy; in late February, it formally
closed the border to Egyptian migrants while, by late March,
Libyan authorities were deporting more than four hundred
workers daily on a variety of charges, even accusing some
of being infected with hepatitis (Middle East News Agency,
March 29).
Similar to Jordan, Libya’s adaptation of displacement
coerced Egypt into compliance. In late March, Egyptian
authorities duly arrested the ex-Gaddafi Libyan officials,
including Ali Maria, the former ambassador to Egypt, and
Mohammed Ibrahim, the brother of senior Gaddafi-era of-
ficial Ahmed Ibrahim. Ahmed Qaddaf Alddam himself was
also arrested (AFP, 2013). The latter “handed himself in to
the security forces after [ten] vehicles surrounded his house
in the Zamalek neighborhood of the Egyptian capital,” ef-
fectively nullifying the Egyptian courts’ decision of nonex-
tradition (BBC News, 2013). Twenty-three other Libyan cit-
izens were immediately arrested and duly extradited. Al-
Ahram cited officials employed in the Egyptian Interpol, who
declared that these extraditions were conducted in return
for Egyptian migrant workers jailed in Libya being released
(al-Ahram, March 28). The timing of these arrests strength-
ens the claim that Egypt complied with Libyan demands be-
cause of the latter’s use of displacement; Prosecutor General
Tala’at Abdallah issued the extradition decision two days
after a Libyan delegation arrived in Egypt on March 19,
bearing an updated list of eighty-eight names of “Gaddafi-
era fugitives” (al-Ahram, March 22). They were returning a
visit to Libya by a delegation representing Egyptian prose-
cution, which had been dispatched to investigate the arrests
of Egyptian migrants and the death of Ezzat Attalah (Daily
News Egypt, March 25). According to al-Hayat, “the Egyptian
authorities wanted to send a positive message to their neigh-
bors and that this was the main reason behind their decision
to act now.” The report continued: “it must be noted that
in the last few months, bilateral relations between the two
neighbors had greatly deteriorated” (al-Hayat, March 20).
Egyptian compliance with Libyan demands led to the
restoration of the status quo ante in terms of migration in-
terdependence, as had occurred in Jordan a few months
earlier. The arrest of the Gaddafi-era elites in Cairo led
Libya to reopen the border between the two countries, af-
ter keeping it closed for more than two months (al-Ahram,
April 26 2016). Providing further proof of the connection
between Egyptian labor migration and the forced repatria-
tion of Libyan elites, “the Libyan authorities also promised
to open their market to the Egyptian workers in case all the
figures taking refuge in Egypt are handed over [emphasis added]”
(al-Hayat, March 20). By June, the Egyptian Ministry of Man-
power and Migration extolled the excellent bilateral rela-
tions between the two countries, going as far as to claim that
Libya was now ready to receive “millions of Egyptians” (al-
Ahram, June 7). The Libyan Deputy Central Bank Governor
Ali Salem Hibri summed up the relationship between Libya
and Egypt: “there are times when your upstairs neighbor has
a leaking pipe and you need to help him fix it for your own
peace of mind” (Reuters, April 16).
Explaining Egyptian Compliance to Host-State Coercion
The previous section identified how two host states lever-
aged their position in order to induce sending-state com-
pliance via two mechanisms, restriction and displacement.
Confirming the study’s first claim, both Jordan and Libya
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migrant labor within their territory in order to induce Egyp-
tian compliance on the issue of natural gas and the ex-
tradition of Libyan elites, respectively. Why would a more
powerful state yield to the demands of two weaker states?
Why was Egypt, a state that numbered more than three mil-
lion labor migrants abroad in 2012, affected by the expul-
sion of a few thousand Egyptians? According to the study’s
second claim, a sending state is likely to comply with a
strategy of displacement when it demonstrates vulnerable
migration interdependence. Indeed, Egypt under Morsi
demonstrated migration interdependence vulnerability for
it satisfied the two conditions theorized above: firstly, it faced
a lack of alternative states able to shoulder the political
economy costs of Jordanian and Libyan strategies, and, sec-
ondly, its economy was not in a position to absorb these costs
domestically.
With regard to the first condition for establishing vul-
nerability, the ruling Muslim Brotherhood was viewed with
distrust, to say the least, by the vast majority of the
conservative Arab monarchies due to their fear of a “domino
effect” after the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions and their
historically hostile views on the Muslim Brotherhood it-
self (Ryan 2014). While Egypt had received diverse forms
of aid from oil-producing Arab states, particularly Saudi
Arabia, under Sadat and Mubarak, its regional isolation un-
der the Morsi presidency strongly suggested that the post-
2011 situation was completely different. As a result, it was
highly unlikely that displaced Egyptian workers from Libya
or Jordan would be redispatched to other oil-producing
Arab states that had supported Egypt economically be-
fore the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, not
only were Arab oil-producing states unwilling to support
Morsi by absorbing any costs, but Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates—the three main host states in
2012—were themselves engaging in a strategy of restriction
against Egypt, by arresting Egyptian labor migrants with sus-
pected ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (for more details,
see National 2013).
With regard to the second condition for establishing vul-
nerability, the deteriorating condition of the Egyptian econ-
omy implied that the state was unable to absorb the burden
of host states’ displacement strategies. In November 2012,
a few weeks before the Jordanian crisis, Morsi had turned
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $4.8 billion
loan in order to help Egypt stay afloat. But Egypt’s inability
to meet the Fund’s loan requirements delayed the signing of
the agreement until after Morsi was ousted from power. As
Egypt’s foreign reserves plummeted, economic remittances
from Arab host states came to form a major part of the
national economy, while Egypt’s high unemployment rate,
growing from 9 percent to 12.7 percent in 2012, implied
that Egypt was increasingly reliant on continuing labor em-
igration as a socioeconomic “safety valve” and was unable
to absorb any displaced workers domestically. While she re-
fused to disclose any details on the Jordanian and Libyan
cases, Nahed Ashry, Minister of Manpower and Migration,
stated that “Egyptians [working] in Arab sister-countries are
more important to the Egyptian state than ever before”
(personal interview, February 24, 2014). It bears noting
that Egyptian labor in both post-2011 Libya and Jordan has
been typically employed in the unskilled and semiskilled sec-
tors, which made reintegration into the Egyptian economy
highly problematic. Retail, tourism, and the unskilled sector
were already overburdened in Egypt, which indicates that
the economic impact of displacement was amplified given
the spiking unemployment rates, the increased demand on
government services, and broader strains on infrastructure.
Two historical examples of earlier attempts at exploit-
ing Egyptian migration interdependence help shed light
on the importance of these two conditions in establishing
vulnerability. Gaddafi would deport thousands of Egyptian
workers out of Libya in the mid-1970s, whenever his re-
lations with the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat deterio-
rated (Tsourapas 2017). When, in 1976, Gaddafi expelled
thousands of Egyptian migrants, Der Spiegel interviewed Sa-
dat on his counterstrategy. “Well … we don’t take the sit-
uation so seriously,” Sadat responded, sketching out the
two conditions establishing migration interdependence vul-
nerability. “We are ready to absorb our workers; they can
find work here, or in other Arab countries” (quoted in Der
Spiegel, 1976). Indeed, Egypt at the time did not meet ei-
ther of the two vulnerability conditions. For one, the close
relationship between Egypt and the Gulf states meant that
the latter were willing to absorb any political economy
costs by recruiting those displaced Egyptians (Feiler 2003,
98–116). “[Egypt had] zero worry,” recalled former Prime
Minister (1974–1975) Abd El Aziz Hegazi. “We relied on the
help of the Saudis when we dealt with … Qaddafi’s actions”
(personal interview, April 27, 2014). At the same time, elites’
ability to continue expanding the Egyptian economy’s pub-
lic sector also allowed for the partial absorption of displaced
migrants’ costs domestically, as the economy profited from
the 1975 reopening of the Suez Canal, increased revenues
from tourism and oil exports, remittances from Egyptians
in the Gulf, as well as American and Arab financial aid. De-
spite the fact that Libya constituted the largest regional host
state for Egyptian migrants at the time, Egypt did not comply
with Gaddafi’s demands, for it was not vulnerable to Libyan
strategies.
In 1990, President Saddam Hussein ordered the displace-
ment of Egyptians from Iraq (at the time hosting more
than 44 percent of all Egyptian regional migrants), partly
to compel Egypt to withdraw from Operation Desert Storm
(Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 288). “The Iraqis, they
were our brothers, but now after two weeks everything has
changed,” one returning migrant told the New York Times
in August 1990, reporting harrowing stories of rape and
theft. Egyptian deportees exiting Iraq recounted how they
“had to sleep at night in desert camps, and Iraqi soldiers,
they came in the night and searched our pockets” (New
York Times, August 22, 1990). Despite the forced return of
more than seven hundred thousand migrants (Feiler 2003,
245), Egypt did not shift its policy on Iraq. While Egypt
was not able to absorb these costs domestically (only a
year later, in 1991, Mubarak had to resort to the IMF and
initiate an arduous process of economic restructuring), it
was able to locate alternative host states willing to shoul-
der the cost. Saudi Arabia and Libya, with whom Egypt had
friendly relations (Vandewalle 2012, 179), absorbed the dis-
placed migrants out of Iraq and minimized the socioeco-
nomic cost to Egypt. In terms of Saudi Arabia, Feiler writes
the following:
Fortunately for Egypt, Saudi Arabia offered [Egypt]
various economic compensations for its cooperation
with the anti-Iraqi coalition, and by the end of April
1991, the number of Egyptian workers in Saudi
Arabia had reached 1.25 million—double their pre-
war number. (Feiler 2003, 244)
But Libya also came to the help of Egypt: “it is inter-
esting to note that the moment relations between Egypt
and neighboring Libya improved … [more than fifty thou-
sand] Egyptians moved into Libya seeking employment,”
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Table 2. Geographical distribution of Egyptian regional migrants
1990 & 1993 (by percentage)
Country 1990 1993
Iraq 44.1 6.9
Saudi Arabia 29.3 45.9
Kuwait 9.3 9.0
Jordan 6.5 9.4








Source: Farrag (1995, 73)
“So long as Egyptian migrant labor found ready employ-
ment in these Arab countries … things went well“ (Vatikiotis
1991, 432–33). While Saudi Arabia and Libya do not re-
lease detailed migration statistics for security reasons, Far-
rag has estimated the geographical distribution of Egyp-
tian regional migrants before and after Operation Desert
Storm (see Table 2). Her findings exemplify Egypt’s strat-
egy of shifting the cost of host-state coercion to alternative
host states. Overall, the fact that the Egyptian economy was
not in a position to absorb the cost of Iraq’s strategy of dis-
placement did not render Egypt vulnerable to it: given that
oil-producing Arab states were willing to shoulder this cost,
Egypt did not satisfy one of the two conditions establishing
migration interdependence vulnerability and was able to re-
sist Iraqi coercion (for contrast, see footnote 3).
In sum, unlike earlier coercive attempts against Egypt un-
der Sadat or Mubarak, the two cases examined in this study’s
empirical section occurred at a time when Egypt was both re-
gionally isolated and economically weak. As such, the article
demonstrated how a sending state that is neither able to shift
the cost of host-state strategies to other states nor able to
absorb this cost domestically exhibits migration interdepen-
dence vulnerability and, thus, is likely to comply. Egyptian
noncompliance to Libya and Jordan would have likely been
an option in two counterfactual cases, as per the article’s
theoretical framework: firstly, had Morsi been able to shift
the cost to another regional state (as per Mubarak’s strategy
in 1990), and, secondly, if the Egyptian economy had been
able to absorb these costs domestically (as per part of Sadat’s
strategy in 1976).
Conclusion
This article developed a framework for understanding how
labor migration features in coercive interstate relations.
It analyzed the mechanisms through which host states at-
tempt to leverage their position against sending states, as
well as the conditions under which such a strategy suc-
ceeds. I argued for viewing these dynamics through the
prism of migration interdependence: reciprocal political
economy effects created through cross-border population
mobility between sending and host states. A host state may
attempt to leverage its position via restriction, namely the
imposition of costs via curbing remittances, immigration,
or both. It may also attempt to do so via displacement,
namely the forced expulsion of a sending state’s migrant
group. The effectiveness of restriction or displacement de-
pends on whether a sending state is vulnerable to migration
interdependence. Vulnerable sending states are more likely
to comply with host-state demands, particularly if a host state
exercises a strategy of displacement rather than one of mere
restriction. I detailed an unexplored aspect of migration
diplomacy by drawing on Middle East cases to highlight the
potential potency of labor migration as a weapon of weak
host states against stronger sending states.
Do my arguments travel beyond the two cases discussed
here? Some examples highlight frequent uses of restriction
and displacement by host states; in Afghanistan, authorities
have not hesitated to use both restriction and displacement
against Pakistani labor migrants entering the country since
mid-2016. Afghanistan recently adopted a law that requires
passports, rather than mere identity cards, and frequently
deported Pakistani labor migrants, in an effort to force
Pakistan to reverse its decision to unilaterally close the
Chaman border crossing (Times of India 2016); in response,
in March 2017, Pakistan’s prime minister decided to open
the crossing “as a gesture of goodwill” (BBC News 2017).
Elsewhere, bilateral disputes between Egypt and Sudan, in-
cluding the contested border of the Halayeb Triangle, led
Khartoum to adopt a strategy of restriction in April 2017,
by barring entry to Egyptian men aged between sixteen and
fifty without visas (Atef 2017). In both cases, my framework
should help make sense of the nature of these strategies and
the mechanisms that account for their effects.
This article challenges long-held understandings of cross-
border migration as necessarily conducive to interstate co-
operation. In doing so, the article avoids reproducing the
conventional wisdom that stronger states induce weaker
ones into compliance; rather, it affirms Keohane and Nye’s
(2012) insight that, under certain conditions, weaker states
can successfully employ a nonmilitary coercive strategy
against more powerful states. In explaining the dynamics
of such processes, the article also intervenes in ongoing de-
bates within the growing literature on migrant remittances
by putting them firmly into conversation with work on eco-
nomic sanctions. Future work should test, and modify, my
framework via medium- and large-N studies of host-state
leverage strategies against sending states. We also need ad-
ditional single-case or small-N studies to uncover the polit-
ical importance of sending states’ sensitivity to migration
interdependence. Even if this study suggests that host-state
attempts at manipulating sensitivity interdependence are
unlikely to succeed, this does not mean that such efforts
are politically unimportant. Finally, we should conduct re-
search on host-state leverage within a cooperative, rather
than coercive, migration diplomacy framework: What are
the mechanisms through which migration interdependence
might provide host states with “carrots” rather than “sticks”
in the management of bilateral relations? Under what con-
ditions would preferential access to a host-state labor mar-
ket, or the reduction of taxes imposed on migrant remit-
tances, contribute to policy changes in sending states? The
mechanisms and dynamics of host-state use of labor migra-
tion against sending states constitute an important, under-
explored field of inquiry in the study of world politics.
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